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Abstract
This thesis presents a stock-flow consistent model (SFC) that analyzes
the effects of Germany’s wage moderation on other Eurozone economies. It
shows that excessive German saving comes at a cost: the decoupling of productivity growth and real wage growth for the largest share of the German
workforce relies on internal and external debt. The SFC model presented in
this paper is inspired by the recent Eurozone model by Gräbner et al. (2021)
that is published as a working paper. Germany’s wage moderation will be
discussed as an example for how income inequality reduces domestic aggregate demand but gets compensated through an increase in net exports. This
allows to derive some general conclusions about the nexus between income
inequality, secular stagnation and financial instability. If the institutional
structure of the EMU is not changed, Germany will continue to free-ride
on the aggregate demand created by debt-led growth in peripheral EMU
economies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Economic inequality is often criticized on normative grounds such as fairness or
its distortionary effect on democratic decision making (Wade 2005, Pickett and
Wilkinson 2015, Scanton 2018). The aim of this paper, however, is to examine its
macroeconomic implications.
Economies with increasing income inequality face a growth problem. The reason for this is straightforward: high income groups have a higher propensity
to save than low income groups which is why income inequality depresses aggregate demand and output (Kaldor 1955, Dynan et al. 2004, Saez and Zucman
2016).

Figure 1: Saez and Zucman 2016, p.564
The nexus between income inequality and financial instability is well established in the Post-Keynesian literature (Keynes GT Ch. 8, Kalecki 1938, Kaldor
1955, Pasinetti 1962, 1974, Robinson 1962, Kalecki 1971, Hein 2014, van Treeck
2013, Belabed et al. 2018) but also gaining prominence in mainstream macroeconomic research (Mian et al. 2021/forthcoming, Mian and Sufi 2010/2011/2018,
Mian et al. 2017).1 Increasing income inequality (both functional and personal)
1 Recent

empirical finance papers published in the top-5 economics journals have made striking observations which run contrary to the economic orthodoxy. Mian, Straub and Sufi (2020),
for example, find a simultaneous increase in the debt to GDP ratio and a decrease in interest
rates for the US between 1970 and 2020. Their finding is counter intuitive because one might
expect the interest rate, as the price of debt, to increase with an increasing amount of debt. In a
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attaches a larger part of GDP to higher saving rates. However, saving is a two
step-decision (Keynes 1936, chapter 6) and not ex ante identical to investment
as in a corn economy. 2 Therefore, an increase in the aggregate saving rate can
drag aggregate demand and growth. Therefore, the cost of saving is high in a
monetary economy. 3 The income inequality of the decades prior to the global
financial crisis (GFC) in 2007/8 was accompanied by increasing household leverage, thereby even reducing the overall saving rate and pumping up demand
(Zezza 2008, Fazzari 2022, already discussed by Marx 1894(1992) Chapter 25 and
expanded by Luxemburg 1913(2003) chapter 30).
Growth can only be achieved if the income inequality induced loss in aggregate
demand is compensated by either an increase in investment (a), an increase in
the government deficit (b), an increase in domestic leverage (c), an increase in
net exports (d), or by a combination. As investment has slowed down in all advanced capitalist countries (Koo 2015, ECB 2016) 4 and government deficits are
limited due to austerity ideology and fiscal rules (Herndon et al. 2014 on Reinhart and Rogoff’s Growth in a time of debt, Sawyer 2018), growth in the past
decades has mainly been driven by (c) and (d), or a combination of both (Barba
and Pivetti 2009, Gu and Huang 2014, Kapeller and Schütz 2014). Why are some
second paper, the same authors argue that increasing income inequality created a savings glut
among the rich, which financed the consumption of the bottom 90% of the income distribution
instead of investment (2021). The expansion of household credit is seen as the main driver for
the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007/8 (Schularick and Taylor 2012). Kumhof, Rancière and
Winant (2015) observe a co-movement of income inequality and household leverage prior to the
GFC and the Great Depression of the 1930s. However, authors that study the general relationship between economic inequality and financial crises in larger samples find mixed and often
insignificant results (Bordo and Meissner 2012
2 “The theory which I desiderate would deal (...) with an economy in which money plays
a part of its own and affects motives and decisions and is, in short, one of the operative factors
(...), so that the course of events cannot be predicted, either on the long period or in the short,
without a knowledge of the behavior of money (...). And it is this which we ought to mean when
we speak of a monetary economy.” (Keynes, Festschrift, 1933)
3 “Every such attempt to save more by reducing consumption will so affect incomes that
the attempt necessarily defeats itself. It is, of course, just as impossible for the community as
a whole to save less than the amount of current investment, since the attempt to do so will
necessarily raise incomes to a level at which the sums which individuals choose to save add up
to a figure exactly equal to the amount of investment.” (GT, Chapter 7)
4 This phenomenon is explained differently by different schools of thought. New-Keynesian
scholars would emphasize the decreasing marginal productivity of capital while PostKeynesians might focus on uncertainty, high liquidity premia and income inequality leading to
a low level of effective demand. Marxists see the decline in investment as capitalism’s “disease
of old age” (Sweezy 1942, p. 189) based on the relations of production and the decline in the rate
of profit as a secular consequence of competition.
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countries able to fix their demand problem abroad while others fix it domestically? Behringer and van Treeck (2021) argue that countries which experience a
shift in their functional income distribution tend to develop export-led growth
regimes while countries that face a shift in their personal income distribution
tend to develop consumer debt led growth due to Veblenian dynamics (see also
Belabed et al. 2018).
A lot of scholarship has been devoted to study the latter dynamic, for example
the importance of US consumer debt in the upswing before the global financial
crisis in 2007/2008 (see van Treeck 2013 for a survey). It is argued that the decline in aggregate demand due to a shift in the personal income distribution
was masked by an increase in household loans that were underpinned by an
asset bubble. This is why the aggregate saving rate in the U.S. actually declined
prior to the GFC despite the surge in income inequality (Zezza 2008, Nikiforos
2016, Fazzari 2022). This nexus is formalized in a Kaldorian model by Nikiforos
as a “non-behavioral theory of saving”: in an environment of current account
deficits, restricted fiscal policy and income inequality, full employment can be
maintained through increasing leverage of the bottom 90% of the income distribution (2016).
In this paper, I will take Germany’s wage moderation of the 2000s as an example
for how a shift in the functinal income distribution reduces domestic aggregate
demand but gets compensated by an increase in net exports. The flipside of Germany’s current account surpluses are current account deficits in the peripheral
economies of the Emropean Monetary Union (EMU, abstracting from the current account surplus of the EMU with the rest of the world). Hence, Germany’s
export-led growth is partly driven by debt-led growth in peripheral Europe.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Why Monetary Economies are Demand-led
Orthodoxy is agnostic towards economic inequality as long as factor returns
represent marginal productivity, and marginal productivity of CEOs can be very
high in neoclassical theory. Orthodox economists that think outside the representative agent framework agree with the notion that higher income earners
have a higher savings rate and talk about a “Saving Glut of the Rich” (Mian
6

et al. 2020). In a non-monetary economy, increasing savings provide increasing supply in the market for loanable funds and thereby investment which is
seen as the long run determinant of economic growth.5 Therefore, one has to
explain the bold claim that income inequality is a hindrance for growth and stability. From the following discussion it will become clear that money is the issue.
Money makes the model of the economy more complex and introduces a range
of paradoxes Keynes and his followers discovered as soon as it is introduced
into macroeconomic analysis.
Keynes’ proposition was that monetary economies are fundamentally different
from the barter abstraction with a loanable funds market.6 In the Festschrift for
Arthur Spiethoff (1933) Keynes explicitly states that he developed his theory in
opposition to Marshall’s Principles which dealt with “relative exchange values”
and money as a veil:
“The theory which I desiderate would deal, in contradistinction
to this [Marshall], with an economy in which money plays a part of
its own and affects motives and decisions and is, in short, one of the
operative factors in the situation, so that the course of events cannot be predicted, either on the long period or in the short, without
a knowledge of the behavior of money between the first state and
the last. And it is this which we ought to mean when we speak of a
monetary economy.” (Festschrift, 1933)7
5A

nice critique can be found in Robinson’s Essay on Marxian Economics: “But in the orthodox scheme the theory of employment scarcely existed, and in its original setting the chief
use to which the argument was put was to justify the unequal distribution of income. Unequal
distribution is favourable to saving, since it concentrates large incomes in the hands of a few individuals who can saturate their demands for consumption and accumulate wealth without any
uncomfortable tightening of the belt. Thus any assault upon inequality, for instance by heavily
progressive taxation, is held to be dangerous to society, since it dries up the source of capital accumulation and so prevents economic progress (...) Moreover, if society is conceived to tolerate
inequality in order to promote saving, it is obvious that a large part of the higher incomes runs
to waste in providing the rich with a luxurious standard of life. Unequal distribution of income
is an excessively uneconomic method of getting the necessary saving done. The argument that
inequality is justified because it promotes saving turnes inside out, and becomes an argument in
favour of corporate saving by the state combined with an egalitarian distribution of consuming
power.” (1942, p. 64-65)
6 I’m actually not sure if the loanable funds market necessarily implies barter. The idea of a
neutral rate is a non-inflationary rate, hence a rate, which leads to an equalization of savings and
investment. Investment can be independent of savings, but when too high because interest rates
too low, it simply is inflationary (see Hayek 1933). Therefore, the distinction between Keynes
and neoclassical economics is again on the persistence of full employment.
7 Keynes continues: “Nevertheless it is my belief that the far reaching and in some respects
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As capitalism is characterized by expensive and debt financed capital equipment, money does not lubricate any barter exchange but marks the start and
end of any cycle of production (see also the contributions by Hawtrey, Robertson or Hahn).8 The differential between the two sums, monetary profit, is the
main motive of production. Money is understood as an asset whose main return
is subjective: liquidity. Saving then means spending less than one’s (monetary)
income in order to hold a liquid position. This has led to the famous paradox of
thrift: If individual agents try to save more, the aggregate saving rate might actually decline because the attempt to save foremost reduces aggregate demand
and thereby income of which individuals can save.9
In the General Theory, investment is determined independent from savings.10
Liquidity preference, the aim of storing savings in a liquid position, determines
asset prices which determines investment. The necessary aggregate equality
of investment and savings is achieved through an adjustment of income by
the multiplier. In opposition to the New-Keynesian view which is dominating
economics today, Keynes was very explicit on this:
“The novelty in my treatment of savings and investment consists,
not in my maintaining of their necessary aggregate equality, but
in the proposition that it is, not the rate of interest, but the level of
incomes which (in conjunction with certain other factors) ensures
this equality.” (1937, p.249)
fundamental differences between the conclusions of a monetary economy and those of the more
simplified real-exchange economy have been greatly underestimated by the exponents of traditional economics; with the result that the machinery of thought with which real-exchange economics has equipped the minds of practitioners in the world of affairs, and also of economists
themselves, has led in practice to many erroneous conclusions and policies.”
8 Fazzari and Minsky write: “The Wall Street vision of business people and bankers negotiating liability structures to finance asset holdings and activity, and these liability structures being
validated or repudiated by events that happen later in calendar time, is the essential theoretical
and institutional structure upon which Keynesian theory is based” (1984, p.106).
9 “Every such attempt to save more by reducing consumption will so affect incomes that
the attempt necessarily defeats itself. It is, of course, just as impossible for the community as
a whole to save less than the amount of current investment, since the attempt to do so will
necessarily raise incomes to a level at which the sums which individuals choose to save add up
to a figure exactly equal to the amount of investment.” (GT, Chapter 7).
10 “The introduction of an independent investment demand function together with the rate
of capacity utilization as an endogenous variable breaks the identity between saving and investment, and generates a class of Keynesian models in which Say’s Law does not hold.” (FMT
textbook, p.240)
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Output is determined by effective demand, and fluctuations in effective demand are mainly driven by investment which is constrained by liquidity preference, hence by the existence of money (Kregel 1985).11 This is why monetary
economies usually equilibrate below full capacity (Lavoie 2014, Stockhammer
2021). There is a gap between potential output (if all factors of production were
employed efficiently) and real output.
Keynes frames saving as a “two-sided affair” in the General Theory (Chapter 7).
First, individuals decide to not consume all of their income. Second, individuals
decide how to allocate their savings. In a barter economy, the savings necessarily consist of real assets (investment). In a monetary economy, individuals can
decide from a variety of financial instruments. The higher the liquidity preference, the stronger the wedge between actual investment and investment necessary for full employment, the stronger the depressionary effect of saving and,
therefore, of income inequality. In the short run, income inequality increases the
output gap. In the long run, income inequality furthermore decreases potential
output through a decline in investment and therefore productive capacity.12
If the economy is below full employment, increasing spending, e.g. through
redistribution, government spending, investment, consumer leverage, or export
demand, can boost growth without causing inflation or crowding out other investment.13 Changes in demand can have permanent effects through their effect
on investment (hysteresis). This is because an increase in investment increases
11 “It

is in this sense that money is a ‘real’ phenomenon: changes in the price of money, the
rate of interest, will bring about changes in the rates of return on capital goods and thus cause
investment and income to adjust. At the same time, this argument shows clearly that Keynes’s
theory of interest is simply the other side of the multiplier medal.” (1988 p.237)
12 Keynes: “That the world after several millennia of steady individual saving, is so poor as
it is in accumulated capital-assets, is to be explained, in my opinion, neither by the improvident
propensities of mankind, nor even by the destruction of war, but by the high liquidity- premiums formerly attaching to the ownership of land and now attaching to money. I differ in this
from the older view as expressed by Marshall with an unusual dogmatic force in his Principles
of Economics, p. 581: Everyone is aware that the accumulation of wealth is held in check, and
the rate of interest so far sustained, by the preference which the great mass of humanity have
for present over deferred gratifications, or, in other words, by their unwillingness to ’wait’.”
(General Theory, p. 121)
13 Part of this are two further paradoxes. First, an increase in the wage share can increase capacity utilization and thereby investment if the economy is wage led (Paradox of Cost), see FMT
textbook, Chapter 12). Second, a tax on capital income can increase profits when redistributed
to workers through the increase in aggregate demand (Paradox of Profit). This is because an
increase in the tax on capital income increases aggregate demand as potential savings (leakages)
are taxed and added as a quasi autonomous component to aggregate demand which increases
the equilibrium amount of profits (Kalecki 1937).
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profits. The open economy profit equation, formalized by Kalecki, is given by
the following identity: Aggregate profits are equal to the sum of capitalist consumption, investment, the government deficit and net exports, minus saving out
of wages.14 Therefore, current investment validates past investment by adding
to aggregate demand which is the Widow’s cruse Keynes described in the Treatise on Money (1930, p. 125).
2.2 Varieties of Capitalism and demand-led growth models
Acknowledging that monetary economies are demand-led in conjunction with
the decomposition of aggregate demand has led to the immense literature on
demand-led growth regimes. A lot of this literature goes back to a paper by
Bhaduri and Marglin from 1990 in which the authors show that depending
on the specification of the investment function, economies can be wage-led,
or profit-led (see also Kurz 1990). If an increase in the wage share leads to an
increase in investment through the increase in demand and thereby capacity
utilization, the economy tends to be wage-led. If an increase in the profit share
increases investment through the increase in the profit rate, the economy tends
to be profit-led (for an empirical analysis of profit-led and wage-led regimes, see
Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013, Onaran and Galanis 2014).
But why are some economies wage-led and others profit-led? Over the past
decade, demand-led growth regimes are increasingly acknowledged in the comparative political economy (CPE) literature and thereby causing a shift from the
more supply side oriented Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) based on different labor
market institutions and price competitiveness (Johnston and Regan 2016)15 to
Post-Keynesian growth theory (Baccaro and Pontussion 2016, 2018, Behringer
and van Treeck 2021).
The wage-led profit-led framework has been expanded recently to take the depressing effect of income inequality into account. Hein et al. (2021) argue that
what they frame as finance-dominated capitalism has depressed the wage share
and thereby led to the evolution of debt-led private demand (DLPD) and exportled mercantilist (ELM) regimes in formerly wage-led economies. Both regimes
14 “Workers

spend what they get, capitalists get what they spend.”
argument goes that coordinated market economies (CMEs) were able to supress wages
and increase competitiveness while mixed market economies (MMEs) had stronger organization
of labor which led to inflationary pressures (for a critique, see Kohler and Stockhammer 2020,
p.5).
15 The
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were interconnected before the global financial crisis (GFC) as for every net exporter there is a net importer which is likely to lead to persistent indebtedness
of the same countries (Dodig et al. 2016, Hein 2012, 2019). In a panel of 18 countries Behringer and van Treeck (2021) find that countries which experienced a
shift in their functional income distribution tend to develop export-led growth
regimes through the reduction in demand for imports while countries with a
shift in their personal income distribution tend to be DLPD due to Veblenian,
upward looking consumption patterns (Duesenberry 1949, Frank et al. 2014,
Bertrand and Morse 2016)16
Household deleveraging after the GFC turned DLPD regimes either into ELM
regimes when the fiscal space was restricted such as in Spain due to the Maastricht rules, or into domestic demand led (DDL) regimes such as in the U.S. or
the UK where government deficits compensated for household deleveraging
(Hein 2019, Hein and Martschin 2020, Hein et al. 2021).
Kohler and Stockhammer (2020) articulate a subtle critique of the framework
used by Hein and his co-authors. They emphasize to look at drivers of growth
instead of contributors to growth. The growth contributor framework (DLPD
vs ELM) is silent about the actual growth drivers: export sophistication (nonprice competition), fiscal space (government spending), and consumer finance
(Minskyan debt cycles). Kohler and Stockhammer argue that the shift from
current account deficit to current account surplus countries after the GFC only
occurred through a decrease in income which depressed import demand. Hence,
what appears to be a weakly export-led regime in fact has nothing to do with
a country whose growth is based on high tech exports and non-price competition. Instead, the reaction of the government to household deleveraging, either
austerity, or fiscal expansion, fundamentally affected the growth path of the
economies which is similar to Hein’s conclusion though slightly different than
their focus. The change in growth drivers then explains a change in the growth
model.
An example for this is the structural break in the relationship between a country’s economic complexity index (used as a proxy for non-price competition)
and its growth performance. Before the GFC, the relationship was actually neg16 Further

reasons are that coordinated market economies tend to have more regulated financial markets, more public goods provided by the government and unions that not only accept
wage repression but also somewhat constrain CEO pay (Belabed et al. 2018 p.48-50, Behringer
and van Treeck 2021, p.5).
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ative due to household leverage in DLPD regimes leading to growth despite
low economic complexity. After household deleveraging and fiscal austerity, the
relationship between ECI and GDP growth turned positive (Kohler and Stockhammer 2020 p.30). From a growth model perspective, the interconnectedness
of DLPD and ELM regimes broke down after the GFC (Kohler and Stockhammer 2020, p.35). Due to household deleveraging, demand for exports from ELM
countries has decreased leading to stronger domestic growth drivers despite
ongoing and structural surpluses (Kohler and Stockhammer 2020, p.17). Kohler
and Stockhammer conclude:
“Macroeconomic Regimes are stable for a while, but then endogenously undermine themselves through unintended outcomes like
high inflation or financial instability that trigger political pressures
towards regime change.” (Kohler and Stockhammer 2020, p.35)
The proposed focus on growth drivers (consumer finance or economic complexity) instead of growth contributors (consumption or net exports) allows to
incorporate a stronger emphasis on financial relations and cyclical growth patterns (Borio 2014, Kohler and Stockhammer 2020). Minsky’s financial instability
hypothesis was initially developed to explain the endogenous fragility of investment17 , but can be applied to debt financed consumption, for imported or
domestic goods, as well (Ryoo 2016, Fazzari 2022).
Taking consumer finance as an example and looking back to the Kalecki equation: negative saving out of wages increases profits and thereby stimulates the
economy (Iacoviello 2008). If real wages are stagnant, household mortgages can
be validated through increasing leverage of other households leading to an increase in house prices, which resembles a version of Minsky’s increasing margin
of safety through the increase in net worth through increasing the equity share
on household balance sheets (Tymoigne and Wray 2014). Validation, however,
increases fragility through adaptive expectations under uncertainty (Fazzari
2022, p.9).
Risk, as measured by the standard deviation of returns, decreases in periods
of validation. This leads to less collateral demanded even in a situation where
17 It

adds a financial theory of investment to Keynes’s investment theory of the cycle as “monetary and financial institutions will affect the path of the economy through time” (Minsky 1993
p.17).
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the actual distribution of returns remains unchanged or even gets more dispersed (Kregel 2008)18 If cash flows are sufficient to service debt commitments,
the lender interprets this as having been excessively conservative in the past,
and therefore loosens its lending standards over the financial cycle.19 At the
same time, the increase in the stock of debt leads to an increase in the flows of
debt servicing which tends to depress demand assuming saving out of profits is
higher than saving out of wages and household borrowing becomes less elastic
with increasing leverage. Palley notes: “the crux of the argument is that borrowing initially serves to increase aggregate demand and output, but that debt
service payments subsequently serve to reduce them” (1996 p.213, see also Dutt
2006, Stockhammer 2015, Stockhammer and Kohler 2019).20
With an increasingly vulnerable financial structure, the reduction of aggregate
demand through debt servicing ultimately leads to asset sales and a debt deflation, where agents have to sell position in order to make position (Minsky
2008(1975) p.139).21 However, as there is no liquidity in the aggregate (Keynes
1936 p. 155), the fall of asset prices can be very strong. Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis can be seen as an application of Kalecki to time:22
“The financial instability hypothesis relates finance and aggregate
demand through the impact of financial market events upon investment and the impact of investment upon income and on the flows
that are capitalized into the price level of capital and financial assets
18 “[S]uccessful

functioning of a capitalist economy means that there is an increases acceptance of liability structures that pledge ever greater proportions of the expected cash flow from
operations or assets to servicing liabilities.” (Minsky 1988b, p.2).
19 leading to Minsky’s famous notion that stability is destabilizing (Minsky 2008(1975) Chapter 6). The increase of borrower’s and lender’s risk over the business cycle was already discussed by Keynes in the General Theory (1936, p. 145)
20 Leverage and short term growth already discussed by Marx (Capital Vol. 3, Chapter 25)
and expanded by Luxemburg (Accumulation of Capital, Chapter 30)
21 “the burden of debt increases in a deflation. Under these circumstances we can expect the
willingness to go into debt to finance investment to decrease. (. . . ) Furthermore, as prices and
wages fall, the realization spreads that speculative gains can be earned by holding money: velocity will tend to decline. Instead of levering retained quasi-rents to finance investment, firms will
use retained quasi-rents to decrease debts. A wage deflation can be expected to lead to a fall in
real investment below the level at which the initial excess supply of labor existed. Downward
wage flexibility, in a situation with unemployment, will make things worse” (Minsky 2008(1975)
p.139). The last sentence attacks the New-Keynesian interpretation of Keynes. Minsky’s FIH
endogenizes the build up of debt in Fisher’s theory of debt deflation (1933).
22 The capital stock of today depends on expectations of the past but its profitability depends
on investment today which depends on expectations about the future (Minsky 1978, 1992a).
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and that are used to fulfill payment commitments.” (Minsky 1978,
p.6)
The FIH was originally developed as a financial theory of investment: “a decision to invest – to acquire capital assets – is always a decision about a liability
structure (. . . ) [i]nvestment is therefore a financial phenomenon” (Minsky 1986,
p.192 and 209). We can restate and apply Minsky to stagnant incomes: a decision to increase consumption nowadays is also often a decision about a liability
structure: consumption is therefore a financial phenomenon.23
The Minskyan consumer finance cycles which erupted in 2007/8 are closely
linked to asset price inflation. Especially real estate served as collateral for
household loans. Through the appreciation of their real estate, households felt
wealthier and increased borrowing (Boyer 2000, Crouch 2009, Hay 2009, Ansell
2012 p.533, Hay and Smith 2013, Stockhammer and Wildauer 2016b, Chwieroth
and Walter 2019, Adkins et al. 2020, Christophers 2020). This period is described
by Crouch as “privatized Keynesianism” (2009) or by Cynamon and Fazzari
as the “Consumer Age” (2008). Loans were no longer made in expectation of
repayment but to “originate and distribute” (Minsky 1987, Whalen 2017).24 In
1987, Minsky describes a “symbiotic relation between the globalization of the
world’s financial structure and the securitization of financial instruments” and
that “[t]hat which can be securitized will be securitized” (p.1-2).25 Through securitization mortgage rates were very low which is why the causality runs in both
directions: The supply of mortgages increased the demand for houses which increased house prices which increased the value of collateral for consumer loans
in a pro-cyclical manner (Adelino et al. 2012, Tymoigne and Wray 2014, Favra
and Imbs 2015, Di Maggio and Kermai 2017, Mian and Sufi 2019).
Even subprime borrowers saw their house prices increasing which increased
their equity share in their homes which made them qualifying for prime refinancing (Kregel 2008, Mian and Sufi 2019). Mortgages were bundled and sold
23 In a 1990 manuscript, Minsky indicated: “The modern credit card economy carries the
household indebtedness phenomena to new heights” (p.11), unfortunately, without elaborating
this thought further.
24 Securitization is an example for the paradox of risk: The individual attempt to reduce
risk leads to an increase in systemic risk that has to be ex-post validated by the central bank
(Wojnilower 1980)
25 Minsky also links the emergence of securitization as an innovative response by mortgage
lenders to Volcker’s interest rate policies (ibid. p.3).
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in tranches of which some were rated triple A allowing institutional investors
such as pension funds to participate. In summary, asset based lending replaced
income based lending in the 2000s (Tymoigne 2014). In their empirical analysis, Kohler and Stockhammer find a strong positive link between house prices
and growth for 30 OECD countries (2020, p.3). Piling up consumer debt led to
an increase in debt service which erupted in an asset fire sale starting in 2007
(Kumhof et al. 2012, 2015). The nexus between income inequality, stagnation
and financial fragility is summarized by Fazzari:
“[N]ow that unsustainable household borrowing no longer props
up household demand, the chickens of inequality-induced demand
drag have come home to roost. High and rising economic inequality
explains secular stagnation of household demand, stagnation that
was hidden during a nearly three-decade Minsky cycle” (2022 p.24)
In this section, I have argued that monetary economies usually operate below
capacity which is why a variety of growth regimes emerge that have dialectical
relationships with each other. In the next section, I will discuss various channels
that reduced wages in Germany and how they have affected growth models in
the EMU.

3. LABOR MARKET ROFORMS IN GERMANY
3.1 Schröder and the Agenda 2010
The end of the Soviet Union influenced the German economy mainly via two
channels. First, the German reunification increased the public deficit and the
unemployment as noncompetitive former state owned companies got privatized by the Treuhand and 16 million citizens of the former German Democratic
Republic (GDR) were integrated into the social security system of Western Germany (Bofinger 2017). Second, some German manufacturing got outsourced to
the newly independent countries, which is why the economic complexity index
has increased for eastern European countries (Kohler and Stockhammer 2020,
p.30), and some companies would threat to relocate production. Overall unemployment was cyclical but with an upward trend. Germany was framed as the
“sick man of Europe” (Dustmann et al. 2014).
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Only 15 years later, Germany rose to a global export power. There are different
narratives of the apparent German success story. Some emphasize the extraordinary productivity growth while others argue that German exports are merely
the result of beggar-thy-neighbour wage moderation and thereby questioning
if German exports should be considered a success story at all (Lapavitsas et al.
2011, Stockhammer 2011, Bibow 2012, Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2013, Bofinger
2015, Wren-Lewis 2015).
The latter narrative starts in the end of the 1990s with the election of Gerhard
Schröder. His coalition of the SPD (center-left) and the Green Party initiated the
pact for work, education and competitiveness (Bündnis für Arbeit, Ausbildung
und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit) as a joint project with unions and employer organizations. The agreement contained implicit agreements on wage moderation
in exchange for job security as well as an increase in the flexibility of part-time
work contracts (Wolf 2000, Bündnis 2000, Bofinger 2017). In a similar vein, the
2004 Pforzheim agreement of metal and electrical unions institutionalized wage
moderation (Bofinger 2017).
Another major change was introduced by the Hartz reforms that were part of
the so called Agenda 2010 and introduced between 2003 and 2005. The Hartz
I-III reforms created new types of employment (“Minjobs”) 26 , deregulation
of short term work agencies, increase in Ich-Ags/Me.Inc’s), wage subsidies
(Bedarfsgemeinschaften), financial sanctions for declining job offers and the
of the restructuring Federal Employment Agency (Launov and Wälde 2016).
Employees of the new Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Agency for Work) received
premia for putting unemployed into any type of employment independent of
the workers satisfaction or the duration of the subsequent employment type
(Hannemann 2015, p. 33). The Hartz IV package is the most prominent one of
the reforms. It became effective in 2005 and introduced a cut of the duration
of unemployment benefits of 60-67% 27 of the previous wage from 32 to 12
months, as well as making the follow up benefits purely means tested and even
taking income of relatives for this into account (Hochmuth et al. 2021).
3.2 Germany’s Labor Market after the Reforms
German unemployment declined from 5 to 3 million between 2005 and 2008,
26
27

A work contract which allowed for a 400€ per month salary being free of tax.
67% for unemployed labor force participants with children.
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exports rose to 1.7trn Euro (½ of GDP) in 2011 (Dustmann et al. 2014). Krebs and
Scheffel (2013) find that the Hartz reforms reduced the non-cyclical component
of unemployment in Germany by 2.8 percentage points. Launov and Wälde
find that the Hartz reform explain 20% of the post-reform unemployment decline (2016). The reforms created winners and losers: High income earners paid
lower social security contributions while short and long term unemployed experienced an increase in the precariousness of their living conditions (Hochmuth
et al. 2021). The reduction in benefits for early retirement increased the employment rate the elderly population (Odendahl 2017). Overall, the reforms have
contributed to the rising trend in short term work contracts and the low wage
sector 28 from 16% of all work contracts in 1997 to 25% in 2008 and has stagnated since (Grabka and Schröder 2019). At the Davos Forum of 2005, Schröder
gave a proud speech about Germany’s low wage sector: "We have created one of
the best low wage sectors in Europe (..) for years the unit wage costs have been
stagnating. A good development for investments in this country. 29
Unemployment and net exports in Germany after the Euro
introduction and the Hartz reforms

Figure 2: Data: AMECO, current prices
28

defined as 2/3 of median income.
“Wir haben einen der besten Niedriglohnsektoren aufgebaut, den es in Europa gibt (. . . )
Wir haben seit Jahren in Deutschland eine stagnierende Lohnstückkosten-Entwicklung. Gut für
Investitionen in diesem Land.”
29
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But how important were the Hartz reforms for this? Commentators have mixed
opinions. Bofinger argues that the employment effect of the Hartz Reforms
is overestimated and that the increase in the German low wage sector and
part time employment actually slowed during the early 2000s (2017, similar
Weinkopf 2013). Bofinger further stresses the secular effects of the phasing out
of the German reunification (2017). Between 1989 and 2006 2.8M citizens of the
former Soviet Union received German citizenship and had initially high unemployment rates that declined subsequently (2017, Brück-Klingberg et al. 2007).
A further important contributor to the decline in wage growth are the implicit,
and sometimes explicit, agreements between employer associations, work councils, and trade unions, or “codetermination” (Palladino 2019) mentioned above
(Dustmann et al. 2014).
3.3 Does Germany’s Wage Moderation explain its Export Success?
Overall, a lot of studies see a link between Germany’s wage moderation and
EMU trade imbalances (Lapavitsas et al. 2011, Stockhammer 2011, Bibow 2012,
Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2013, Bofinger 2015, Wren-Lewis 2015). It is argued,
that low wages in Germany’s manufacturing sector outcompeted industry in the
periphery which has led to a de-industrialization in several regions. However,
if all EMU countries have had wage moderation at the same time, demand for
Germany’s export goods would have declined too. Therefore, Bofinger argues
that the success of the German wage moderation depends on rising wages in the
peripheral economies: “[A]ny attempt to improve a country’s competitiveness
via wage moderation has the character of a zero-sum game” (2017).
Wage growth in peripheral EMU countries was different as their labor markets
were characterized by strong unions that allowed real wages to move in line
with productivity gains, and sometimes even more then that (Johnston and Regan 2016). Different inflation rates under the same currency in core and peripheral countries had accumulated to a decline in export competitiveness throughout the early 2000s, while the ECB only targeted average inflation (Strom and
Naastepad 2015c, Gräbner et al. 2020). Diaz Sanchez and Varoudakis (2014) and
Storm and Naastepad (2015c) argue that the low interest rates by the ECB in the
early 2000s were appropriate for stagnant Germany but not for peripheral Europe leading to a debt-led boom and that the ECB rates clearly track the Taylor
rule determined rate for the core.
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Different inflation rates in the EMU prior to the GFC

Figure 3: Data: IMF
In sum, it is argued, trade imbalances rely on changes in unit labor costs: while
wage growth moved in line with productivity growth in the periphery they
decoupled in the core. The story then goes like this: the low interest rates by
the ECB led to very low real interest rates in the periphery. Combined with the
disappearance of exchange rate risk after the introduction of the Euro, this has
led to capital inflows into the peripheral economies, tightening labor markets
and huge investments in real estate development.
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Evolution of real wages and labor productivity

(a) Germany

(b) Italy

(c) Greece

(d) Spain

(e) Portugal

Figure 4: Data: EPWT 7_0, current prices
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Despite numerous attempts of conservative politicians and liberal economists
to deregulate the labor markets in the peripheral economies and to slash social
spending, it took a coordinated attack via the Troika institutions to break resistance after the socialization of private bank losses has led to surging public debt
to GDP ratios (Jaumotte 2011 30 , Storm and Naastepad 2015c, Tsoulfidis et al.
2016, Perez and Matsaganis 2018). The recommendations of the Troika turned
out to be toxic and led to even more divergence as they solely focused on wage
restraint and employer friendly labor market reregulation. 31
The core-periphery patterns persists until today (Simonazzi et al. 2013, Baldwin
et al. 2015, Storm and Naastepad 2015c, Iversen et al. 2016, Johnston and Regan 2016, Regan 2017, Celi er al. 2018, Gräbner et al. 2019, Gräbner et al. 2020).
This is why, later in the model, I will use the term “core” to refer to Northern
EMU economies Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Germany and the
Netherlands, and the term “periphery” in order to refer to Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain. France is hard to locate in this distinction (Gräbner et al.
2019).
There are two potential policy proposals based on the labor cost competitiveness
perspective on EMU trade imbalances. A more left-wing, Keynesian, perspective would aim for increasing wages in the core countries, while a conservative,
neoliberal lens would propose a reduction in wages in the periphery (Sinn 2005,
Stöllinger 2016). After the GFC, the dominant view within Brussel’s policy circles has been close to the neoliberal perspective, hence to put the adjustment
burden on the deficit countries. An attempt of a consensual interpretation of
the Eurozone crisis was published in 2015 by leading economists on Vox according to which the crisis was ultimately caused by a sudden stop of capital flows,
excessive public and private leverage, doom-loops between banks and states,
absence of lender of last resort opportunities and no external devaluation opportunities but mainly underpinned by the “rigidity of factor and product markets”
30

The author of this IMF working paper argues that the Spanish labor market is ”ill-suited to
membership of a currency union”.
31 The IMF recommendations for Greece read for example: “the economy needs to be more
competitive. This means pro-growth policies and reforms to modernize the economy (...) It also
means that inflation be reduced below the euro average, including by keeping wages and wage
costs flat, so that Greece can regain price competitiveness” (IMF 2010) while Jaumotte (2011)
argued that a reduction of employment production would bring down Spanish unemployment
from 25% to 7-10%. Similarly the exclusively labor market focus of the OECD proposals for
growth (2011).
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in the periphery as a hindrance to restore competitiveness quickly (Baldwin et
al. 2015). Similar results can be found in Lane (2012) and Gabrisch and Staehr
(2014). In 2012, the European Commission introduced the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) in order to assess relative changes in competitiveness
of the periphery vis-á-vis the core (Storm and Naastepad 2015c).
Both, the Keynesian as well as the neoliberal perspective on wage competitiveness, however, are criticized by a strand of literature which disaggregates German exports and thereby argues that EMU trade imbalances are largely driven
by non-price competition for which unit labor cost does not really matter.
This strand of literature emphasizes the increase in German labor productivity
especially for high valued added goods relative to low productivity growth in
service sector dominated economies of the periphery. Varieties of capitalism
within the EMU is not so much characterized by different labor market institutions but rather by different industrial structures. In a series of articles, Storm
and Naastepad argue that export performance is hardly driven by unit labor
costs (Storm and Naastepad 2015a, 2015c, Storm 2016). Unit labor costs only explain 25% of output prices for goods since firms passed costs only partly to consumers (Storm 2016). Storm calls the view presented in the previous paragraph
the “labor cost competitiveness myth” (reflecting the Kaldor-Paradox 1978).
Actually, Storm argues, the change in unit labor cost was driven by changes in
productivity as German nominal wages only decreased slightly relative to all
other EMU members between 1999 and 2007 while relative labor productivity
increased by 8%-points (Storm and Naastepad 2015a).
Storm concludes with a bold statement: “It was German engineering ingenuity,
not nominal wage restraint or the Hartz “reforms”, which reduced its unit labor
costs. Any talk of Germany deliberately undercutting its Eurozone neighbors is
therefore beside the point” (2016). Similarly, Wyplosz (2013) and Gabrisch and
Staehr (2014) find that relative unit labor costs only explain a tiny amount of
Germany’s export surpluses and Danninger and Joutz (2007) find in their study
ranging from 1993 to 2005 that relative cost improvements only explain 2% of
Germany’s export growth. Therefore, it is no surprise that Kohler and Stockhammer do not find any increase in growth rates despite real depreciation by
more than -15% measured by the real effective exchange rate in manufacturing
(2020, p.26-27)
Storm and Naastepad (2015a) emphasize income effects and non-price com22

Economic Complexity Index Ranking

Figure 5: Data: ATLAS of Economic Complexity
petition due to technology and exports to emerging markets which is in line
with another range of studies (Gabrisch and Staehr 2014, Diaz Sanchez and
Varoudakis 2013, Storm and Naastepad 2015a, Schröder 2015) 32 . Differences in
technological capabilities lead to divergence and path dependency within the
EMU (Gräbner et al. 2020). Value added in high tech industries has increased
in the core but decreased in the periphery (Strom and Naastepad 2015c). This
is why growth in the periphery transmits to growth in the core but not vice
versa (Janger et al. 2012, Simonazzi, Ginzburg and Nocella 2013, Botta 2014,
O’Connell 2015).
Gabrisch and Staehr show with Granger causality tests and vector autoregressive models that capital flows, especially after the introduction of the Euro removed exchange rate risk and harmonized financial sector regulation (Chen
et al. 2012), precede unit labor cost between 1995 and 2012 for 27 EU countries
32

Schumpeter: “Economists are at long last emerging from the stage in which price competition was all they saw. [...] in capitalist reality, as distinguished from its textbook picture, it
is not that kind of competition which counts, but the competition from the new commodity,
the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization [...] – competition
which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of
the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives.”
(1943 p.84)
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(2014) 33 . For every decrease in the annual current account balance by 1% they
find an increase in unit labor costs on average by 0.3 percentage points for the
subsequent years (similarly Strom and Naastepad 2015c). Lane (2013) finds that
the inflow of foreign capital led to an increase in local credit financed domestic
demand. Atoyan et al. (2012) discuss the eagerness of German banks to expand
their foreign market shares throughout the early 2000s.
Furthermore, China’s emergence on the international trade scene after joining
the WTO in 2001 disrupted trade flows among nearly all advanced capitalist
countries. Regarding the EMU, China initiated a severe price competition vis-àvis peripheral economies while German exports fitted well into the Chinese supply chain and even outcompeted Chinese competitors when entering a market
(Benkovskis et al. 2013, Strom and Naastepad 2015c, Gräbner et al. 2020, Kohler
and Stockhammer 2020, p.9). This pattern reflects a general trend that low-tech
industries often face stronger price competition from emerging economies than
high-tech industries (Carlin et al. 2001, Dosi et al. 2015). Additionally, the common currency harmed the peripheral exports as the Euro has appreciated viaá-vis the US Dollar, the Japanese Yen and the RMB compared to their previous
currencies. Most authors agree that the Euro is overvalued for the core and undervalued for the periphery (Carton and Hervè 2012, Storm and Naastepad
2015c, Mazier p.143). Wierts et al. (2013) show that the negative effect of overvalued real exchange rates on exports is stronger for low-tech industries as they are
more price elastic (Bottega and Romero 2021).
Germany’s specialization in high-tech goods made its export demand inelastic
and often enabled price setting behavior (Simonazzi et al. 2013, Gräbner et al.
2020)34 . There is path dependency in this, resembling the Kaldor-Verdoorn relation: Lower wages can lead to higher profit margins in Germany which leads to
higher investment and productivity growth by employing the latest equipment
but also by raising aggregate demand, employment and thereby the division
of labor (Botta 2014, Storm and Naastepad 2015a, 2015b, 2015)35 . However, the
increase in business saving in the core has not led to increasing investment (Belabed et al. 2018).
33 This idea goes back to Böhm-Bawerk (1924) who argued that current account follows the
capital account. See also Minsky (1988): Money Manager Capitalism, Fiscal Independence and
International Monetary Reconstruction. H. P. Minsky Archive Paper No 431)
34 However, Baccaro and Benassi (2017) argue that that this power has declined after the GFC
35 for a discussion of the Kaldor-Verdoorn law, see Basu and Budhiraja 2021 CJE)
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Additionally, the German reunification and the cheap purchases of firms with
value chains and existing contracts in eastern Europe led to a jump in productivity growth over the 2000s (Simonazzi et al. 2013, Storm and Naastepad 2015b,
Stöllinger 2016, Odendahl 2017).
The related policy proposals are different compared to the wage competitiveness perspective on EMU trade imbalances. More important than changes in
wage levels is active fiscal policy to induce a technological catching-up process by reconsidering the state market dichotomy (Mazzucato 2013, Strom and
Naastepad 2015c, Gräbner et al. 2020) as there is a general trend of increasing
economic complexity and increasing income (Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009).
Productivity is not exogenous but a policy decision and depending on the “social overhead structure of the productive system and technology” (Storm and
Naastepad 2015c, p.866). However, austerity measures such as the Maastricht
criteria 36 or the Euro Plus Pact 37 make this virtually impossible. Sectoral balances determine that structural current account deficits lead to public and or private deficits that accumulate over time. Austerity policies restrict public deficits
and thereby create a permanent private sector crisis in peripheral countries.
I conclude that Germany’s wage moderation matters for EMU trade imbalances
but in a specific way. Putting it bluntly, an increase in German real wages would
not lead to an decrease in periphery’s demand for German machinery. Having
said that, German wages do have a depressionary effect on peripheral Europe
due to the relative high income elasticities of demand for export goods of the
periphery. Both channels lead to a structural trade deficit of the periphery visà-vis Germany. Most importantly, a significant share of the surplus of Germany
is sustained by indebtedness of the periphery (Kohler and Stockhammer 2019).
The combination of export-led and debt-led growth has decoupled productivity
and real wage growth in Germany in the 2000s.
36

The 60% limit of the public debt to GDP ratio and a maximum of 3% primary deficit are
institutionalized in the Stability and Growth pact (Storm and Naastepad 2015c)
37 The Euro Plus Pact was proposed by Germany and France and signed by 23 EU countries
in March of 2011. It contained measures to enhance competitiveness with the aim to reduce
"unsustainable" external debt. “The Euro Plus Pact (...) will further strengthen the economic
pillar of EMU and achieve a new quality of policy coordination, with the objective of improving
competitiveness and thereby leading to a higher degree of convergence.” (European Council
2011, p.5) However, Gabrisch and Staehr (2014) argue that the Euro Plus Pact is based on a
flawed analysis of the causal link between capital flows and unit labor costs (simialry, Gros and
Alcidi 2011). From a Keynesian perspective, increasing competitiveness by reducing unit labor
costs reduces domestic demand and is likely to conversely increase external debt.
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In the following, I propose a comprehensive stock-flow consistent model (SFC)
that summarizes the channels sketched above and thereby allows to assess potential institutional change. A monetary policy that is biased towards inflation
in the core and the removal of exchange rate risk after the Euro introduction
lead to an investment boom in the periphery resulting in tighter labor markets,
real wage growth and moderately higher inflation (Kohler 2022). A simultaneous appearance of China on the world trade stage has led to price competition
with the periphery and a decline in manufacturing that was masked by a debtled real estate boom. The trade imbalances have further widened through wage
moderation in Germany that depressed demand for periphery’s export goods.
Overall, the drag in Germany’s aggregate demand through the increase in income inequality has been replaced by debt-led demand from the periphery.

4. METHODOLOGY
4.1 Stock-Flow Consistent Modeling
SFC models are gaining prominence due to their comprehensive understanding
of the mechanisms that led to the global financial crisis of 2007/8 (Godley and
Zezza 2006, Bezemer 2010, Bank of England 2016) but also due to their methodological consistency regarding the analysis of the real and the financial side of
the economy (Godley and Cripps 1983, Dos Santos and Macedo 2010, Godley
and Lavoie 2012, Pasarella 2019). This is very relevant for ongoing policy discussions around the role of fiscal and monetary policy in an environment of secular stagnation (DeLong and Summers 2012). The SFC aproach is appealing for
the inequality financial crises nexus, as well as for interconnected demand-led
growth regimes, as it takes the interdependencies of all sectors into account.38
While some research groups developed empirical SFC models for certain countries (Papadimitriou et al. 2013, Byrialsen and Raza 2020, Nalin and Yajima 2020)
other’s devoted their energy to theoretical contributions regarding debt cycles
(Dafermos 2018), an increase in dividend payouts (Duwicquet 2021) or share
buybacks (Van Treeck 2009), securitization (Nikolaidi 2015), quantitative easing
38 New-Keynesian

scholars have come up with their own heterogeneous-agent models which
rely on neoclassical microfoundations but include a range of rigidities (Kumhof et al 2015,
Gabaix 2020, Caverzasi and Russo 2018 for a critical discussion)
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(Haas and Young Taft 2017), or climate change (Dafermos et al. 2017). Increasingly, distributional issues are incorporated into the SFC framework (Dos Santos
and Zezza 2008, Carvalho and Di Guilmi 2014, Belabed et al. 2018, Zezza 2019).
Distributional SFCs link the theoretical and empirical Post-Keynesian studies
of growth and distribution with the methodological SFC framework and its
analysis of financial fragility and interdependencies.
Modeling the Eurozone in an SFC framework has a long tradition in the economic thinking of the its main founder, Wynne Godley. A model that was published in 2007 with his co-author Marc Lavoie rather prophetically predicts the
crisis of sovereign debt which evolved between 2010 and 2012 with its effects
being still visible a decade after. Godley and Lavoie mainly argue that countries
with a trade deficit will issue more and more bills that will be purchased by the
common central bank. Assuming limited purchases by the CB, however, the
interest rate on sovereign debt will increase. As devaluation is impossible due to
the common currency and fiscal policy restricted, trade deficits require austerity
with strong negative effects on domestic output and employment (p.2).
In the following, I will present an SFC model which is inspired by the three
regions model developed by Gräbner et al. (2021) 39 . The authors use the terms
“South” and “North” for both regions of the monetary union, however, in light
of economic theory on international dependencies, I prefer the terms “core” and
“periphery” but have used both terminologies interchangeably for now.
4.2. A Replication of Gräbner et al. (2021)
Gräbner et al. (2021) analyze the emergence of debtor-creditor dynamics in a
monetary union. Their basic argument is that initial differences in technological
capabilities translate in different export propensities of which debtor-creditor
dynamics emerge. The monetary union of their model consists of two regions
(North and South), whereas the trade flows of each region with the RoW resembles their trade relations with China. The size of the southern region is 2/3 of
the northern region. Both regions of the monetary union are specified in terms
of aggregate households, firms and banks, as well as a government. Both regions share a central bank. The rest of the world is modeled as an aggregate
sector that exports and imports from both regions.
39

Gräbner et al. (2021) is based on the model presented in Kapeller and Schütz (2014)
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The model presented in this paper adapted some ideas of the model by Gräbner
et al. (2021). I will first comment on the most important features of the model
before explaining the modifications I undertook.
The GDP expenditure equation for region i is given by
GDPi = Ci + Ii + Gi + Xi − I Mi
An equal proportion of Consumption Ci , investment Ii and government spending Gi is imported from the other region j and from the RoW. 40 As imports
require cross-border financing, which can be constrained in this model, the determination of consumption, investment and government spending follows a
three step procedure. Since investment demand entails further complication, I
will take its determination as an example.
Firms
Investment demand in region i depends on an autonomous component i0i , past
period’s capacity utilization zi , profit rate π F,i , and debt ratio DR F,i . All end of
period profits are shifted to the domestic household sector, hence, investment is
financed entirely through bank loans. This lending follows Minskyan dynamics
with a margin of safety θ F,i that declines in every period in which no firm loans
are canceled, but also depends on the firm’s debt ratio and the bank’s leverage
ratio. Firms become credit constrained when the margin of safety exceeds its
profit rate and, hence, can only partially finance their investment demand.
40

GDPi = mi ∗ (Ci + Ii + Gi ) + (1 − mi ) ∗ (Ci + Ii + Gi ) + Xi ˘mi ∗ (Ci + Ii + Gi ) = (1 − mi ) ∗
(Ci + Ii + Gi ) + Xi
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1. Determine demand for investment
2. Are firms in region i credit constrained?

Yes

No

Idi = i0i + i1i ∗ zi + i2i ∗ π F,i + i3i ∗ DR F,i

Idi = rcr ∗ (i0i + i1i ∗ zi + i2i ∗ π F,i + i3i ∗ rDR F,i )

3.Does the national banking system have sufficient reserves to import a fraction of investment
demand?
Yes

No
Id f i = RCCi ∗ Idi

Id f i = Idi

I Md j,i = m j,i ∗ (Cd f i + Id f i + Gd f i )
4.Can the other region supply that demand?
Yes

No
Ii = crri ∗ Id f i

Ii = Id f i
I M j,i = I Md j,i

20

I M j,i = crr j ∗ I Md j,i

20

The same mechanism applies to exports to the RoW: Xdrow,i = mi,row ∗ Yrow → Xrow,i = crri ∗ Xdrow,i
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Idi is the demand for investment in region i, rcr is the rate of credit restriction,
Id f i is the demand for investment goods in region i that can be financed given
reserves, and Ii is the actual investment in region i. RCCi is a factor that distributes the reserves available proportional to demand for importing consumption goods, investment goods, (rcr is the rate of credit restriction). or government spending. As this channel can lead to strong contractions, the central bank
of the monetary union steps in as a lender of last resort when the finance available is less then 75% of import demand. This is prior to quantitative easing and
unlimited Target II clearing. This institutional constraint, that is special in the
Eurozone, will be lifted in a policy scenario. ccr is a capacity restriction rate that
works as a control mechanism to ensure that financed investment demand can
actually be produced by the exporting country given the stock of capital and
capital productivity.
The domestic banking system can obtain reserves either through the interbank
market when the other banking system has excess reserves, or directly from the
ECB. However, when the bank’s rate of profit falls below a Minskyan margin
of safety, the banking system becomes credit constrained and imports can only
partially be financed. The procedure is structured as follows:
1. Reserve demand for clearing trade in region i is determined

2. Is the banking system in region i credit constrained?
No

Yes

Can the excess demand for
reserves from region i be fulfilled by excess supply from
region j?

Import demand is only partially fulfilled (see flow chart
above)

Yes
No ECB loans needed.
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No
The gap can be closed through
ECB loans to region i.

The bank’s margin of safety θ B,i changes over the business cycle. It is reduced in
every period in which no loans are canceled and also depends on both banking
sector’s leverage ratios.
Government
Government spending is equal to government income, consisting of taxes, paid
by the household sector, and the region’s share in ECB profits. In the baseline
scenario, the government budget is therefore balanced. An initial stock of government loans is held by domestic banks. In (rare) times of surpluses, governments accumulate claims against their domestic banking sector. 41
Banks
In the model of Gräbner et al. (2021), banks generally distribute their profits to
the domestic households but retain some earnings when their leverage ratio is
above a threshold and distribute retained earnings when their leverage ratio is
below that threshold. However, it is not clear in which forms those "retained
earnings" are held. Therefore, I exclude this mechanism for now and distribute
all bank profits to the domestic rentiers that hold an initial stock of domestic
bank equities (see Godley and Lavoie 2012, Chapter 11)
A typical bank balance sheet looks like this:
Assets

Liabilities

Household
Loans

Household
Deposits

Government
Loans

Government
Deposits

ECB Reserves

ECB Loans

IB Loans

IB Liabilities

Firm Loans
Equity

41

The deposit account of governments at their domestic banks is only included in the model
to absorb surpluses when the banking system is credit constrained and demand for government
spending, given by its income, can only partially be fulfilled. This channel does not play a
significant role in the current model though.
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4.3 Preliminary Results based on the Replication
The baseline scenario starts with the steady state solutions of a simulation based
on the parameter choices in Gräbner et al. (2021). The public and the external
sector are in balance, the profit rate of firms stabilizes at the equilibrium value
and the margin of safety for firms decreases over the simulation period. The
results for the North looks the same, only GDP is 1.5 times larges than GDP in
the South.
Baseline Scenario South

I then introduce the same shock as Gräbner et al. (2021) to the autonomous
component of the investment function in the South in order to resemble the investment boom in the early 2000s after the introduction of the Euro. Initially, the
increase in investment increases aggregate demand and output and propagates
through the increase in the capacity utilization rate which further increases investment. The real side of the economy looks stable for a while but crashes in
period 150. The boom bust cycles is persistent in the model.
However, in order to understand the fluctuation in the real side of the economy,
we can to look at the financial side. As investment is debt financed, the shock
to the autonomous component of investment leads to an increase in the firm’s
stock of debt. Therefore, debt servicing reduces the profit rate over the financial
cycle until it falls below the margin of safety. In period 150, firms become credit
constrained which leads to a collapse in investment and, therefore, a recession.

32

Boom Bust Cycles after the Investment Boom

The trade balance resembles this dynamic. Since a constant proportion of investment goods are imported, the shock to autonomous investment increases
imports from the North. In the recession, income declines that strong, that the
South becomes a net exporter which echoes the critique of the export-led framework by Kohler and Stockhammer (2020).
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Trade Imbalances

The development of GDP in the North reveals the interdependency of exportled and debt-led growth regimes in both regions. The boom bust cycles in the
South spill over to the North through the increase in imports.
Boom Bust Cyles after the Investment Boom

However, since firms in the North do not pile up debt, their rat of profit follows
the boom bust pattern but never falls below the margin of safety.
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Boom Bust Cycles after the Investment Boom

4.4 Modifications to Gräbner et al.2021
(a) Disaggregating the household sectors
In Gräbner et al. (2021) trade is determined by fixed propensities. This is changed
in this model. I have argued that varieties of capitalism with different labor market institutions and industrial structures affect trade patterns. To take this into
account, I disaggregated the household sectors in both regions into "rentiers"
and "workers". The rentiers receive all domestic bank’s and firm’s profits, interest on their money deposits, pay interest on loans and a repay a fraction of
their debt every period. The workers receive mainly wage income, given by the
region specific wage rate multiplied with the level of employment, plus interest
on money deposits, pay interest on loans and a repay a fraction of their debt
every period. Both classes have the same consumption function as in Gräbner
et al. (2021), though with different parameters. In the Kaleckian tradition, the
propensity to consume out of income is higher for the workers than for the rentiers. Therefore, a shift in the functional income distribution depresses aggregate
demand. I also assume a quite high autonomous component of consumption
leading to increasing household leverage when the economy is in a downturn.
Increasing inequality in the core then translates into less demand for import
goods produced in the periphery. The following discussion will show that
disaggregating the household sector allows to replace some of the ad hoc assumptions made by Gräbner et al. (2021) regarding shocks of the propensities to
import with endogenous labor market determinations of export prices.
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(b) Endogenous price levels and wage determination
Godley and Lavoie (2007) have a flexible exchange rate between the USA and
the Eurozone which is endogenous to the cross border demand and supply for
bills, while Lequain (2003) has a fixed exchange rate. Imports in Godley and
Lavoie (2007) therefore depend on the real exchange rate as well (p.6). For now,
I will assume a fixed exchange rate between the currency of the monetary Union
(Euro) and the RoW (RMB) and a constant labor productivity as in Gräbner et al.
(2021, p.5).
While Godley and Lavoie (2007) model two different currencies for the monetary union and the U.S. neither them nor Belabed et al. (2018) or Gräbner et al.
(2021) model price levels and a labor market determination of export goods
prices. In this model, the price levels for the South and the North are determined by cost plus mark-up equations (as in Dos Santos and Zezza 2008, p.449450, or in the Eurozone model by Duwicquet and Mazier 2012 p.203, see also
see also Taylor 1991 ch.2) whose parameters resemble the varieties of capitalism
literature (see Behringer and van Treeck 2021) and insights from structuralist
Post-Keynesian theory (Kohler and Stockhammer 2020).
The wage rate in region i is given by:
wii = σi0 + σi1 ∗ ∆pie + σi2 ∗ ∆λe − σi3 ∗ ui (−1)
wi = wi (−1) ∗ (1 + wii )
Hence, wage inflation depends on an autonomous component, expected inflation, expected growth in labor productivity and past periods unemployment
rate. For now, the model is stationary. Therefore, the labor productivity term
does not matter.
The price level in region i is given by unit labor cost and a region specific markup:
pi = wi ∗ λ1 ∗ (1 + φi )
i

(c) Imports and price competition
In order to capture the price competition between South and RoW, imports are
not given as a constant proportion of consumption, investment and government
spending as in Gräbner et al. (2021) but depend on relative price levels. As dis36

cussed in the previous section, the imports of the North depend on price competition between the South and the RoW. Therefore, the imports of the South from
the RoW also depend on relative prices as domestic demand in the South will be
substituted to cheaper products. The demand for exports by the North are price
inelastic.
ms,n = ψ0 − ψ1 ∗ ( ps − prow )
mn,s = ψ2 and mn,row = ψ3
4.5 Shocks and Dynamics
The dynamics are introduced as two shocks. First, the price competition components between the South and the RoW of the import propensities are introduced
as a shock resembling China’s membership in the WTO in 2001. Second, the
parameters in the wage equation of the north are shocked a few periods later to
resemble the labor market reforms in Germany in 2004/5. The South faces an investment boom and inflation after the introduction of the Euro. The model will
show an endogenous divergence through loss in competitiveness, and spillover
growth in North through boom bust cycles in the south.
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[1] Consumption
[2] Government Spending
[3] North Imports
[4] South Imports
[5] RoW Imports
[6] [Total Production]
[7] Wage Income
[8] Gross operating surplus
[9] Taxes
[10] Interest on Deposits
[11] Interest on Loans
[12] Interbank Interest Payment North
[13] Interbank Interest Payment South
[14] Interest Payments to CB
[15] Interest on Reserve Deposits
[16] Distributed Firm Profits
[17] Distributed Bank Profits
[18] Profit Central Bank
[19] Surpluses
FLOW OF FUNDS
[20] ∆ Capital
[21] ∆ Deposits
[22] ∆ Loans Core Banks
[23] ∆ Central Bank Loans
[24] ∆ Inter Bank Loans to North
[25] ∆ Inter Bank Loans to South
[26] Foreign Reserve Transactions
[27] ∆ Reserves
OTHER CHANGES IN STOCKS
[28] Firm Debt Cancellation
[29] Interbank Debt Cancellation
[30]
Σ
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0

+I_n

0

0

-∆ M_Rn
+∆ L_Rn

0

0

-∆ M_Wn
+∆ L_Wn

0

-S_Fn

-il*L_Fn(-1)

+GOS_n

North
Firms
C/A

-S_Rn

+S_Wn

Cap.

-DIV_Fn

-S_Wn

-T_Wn
+id*M_Wn(-1)
-il*L_Wn(-1)

+WB_n

Workers
C/A
-C_Wn

+DIV_Fn
+DIV_Bn

+S_Rn

Production Rentiers
C/A
C/A
Cap.
+C_n
-C_Rn
+G_n
-IM_n
+X_s,n
+X_row,n
[Y_n]
-WB_n
-GOS_n
-T_Rn
+id*M_Rn(-1)
-il*L_Rn(-1)

0

+CANC_Fn

+∆ L_Fn

- ∆ K_n

+S_Fn

Cap.

0

+DIV_CBn
-S_Gn

+T_n
+id*M_Gn(-1)
-il*L_Gn(-1)

-G_n

Government
C/A

0

+∆ L_Gn

+S_Gn

Cap.

0

0

-DIV_Bn

-id*M_n(-1)
+il*L_n(-1)
-iIB*L_IBn(-1)
+iIB*L_IBs(-1)
-iIB*L_CBn(-1)
+id*Res_n(-1)

Banks
C/A

0

-S_Rs

+DIV_Fs
+DIV_Bs

0

-∆ M_Rs
+∆ L_Rs

+S_Rs

Production Rentiers
C/A
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[Y_s]
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-GOS_s
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+id*M_Rs(-1)
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-CANC_Fn
+CANC_Bn
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0
0

+∆ Res_n

+∆ M_Hn
-∆ L_n
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+∆ L_IBn
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0
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0

-S_Ws
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0

-∆ M_Ws
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0
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South
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0
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0
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-S_Gs
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0
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+S_Gs
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0

0
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+ ∆ L_CBs
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0
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0

- ∆ Res_f
+ ∆ Res

- ∆ L_CB
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0

Σ
0
0
0
0
0
Y
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
+ ∆ Res_f
0
- ∆ Res_row 0

Cap.

RoW

+X_row,n
+X_row,n
-IM_row
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Table 1: Transactions-Flow Matrix
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0
0

-V_Gn
0

Rentiers
+M_Rs
-L_Rs

0
0

-V_Gs
0

-e_Bs*p^e_s
0
0

South
Workers Firms Government Banks
+M_Ws
+M_Gs
-M_Hs
-L_Ws
-L_Fs -L_Gs
+L_s
+K_s
+Res_s
-L_CBs
+L_IBn
-L_IBs

-e_Bn*p^e_n +e_Bs*p^e_s
0
-V_Rs
-V_Ws
0
0
0

North
Workers Firms Government Banks
+M_Wn
+M_Gn
-M_n
-L_Wn
-L_Fn -L_Gn
+L_n
+K_n
+Res_n
-L_CBn
-L_IBn
+L_IBs

Money Deposits
Bank Loans
Real Capital
Reserve Deposits
CB Loans
Interbank Loans North
Interbank Loans South
Foreign Reserves
Equities
+e_Bn*p^e_n
Balance (net-worth)
-V_Rn
-V_Wn
Σ
0
0

Rentiers
+M_Rn
-L_Rn

RoW

Σ
0
0
+K
-Res
+Res_row 0
+L_CB
0
0
0
+Res_f -Res_f
0
0
0
-V_row
-K
0
0
0

ECB

Table 2: Stock Matrix

5. FURTHER EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
In following research projects, I would like to expand the model with the following mechanism.
(i) Introduce a Taylor rule ECB that is biased towards inflation in the North.
Making the investment function also depending on interest rates, leading to
an endogenous boom in the South in the early 2000s with inflation and loss in
competitiveness vis a vis China.
ii) Introduce internationalization of North’s banks by increasing lending to the
South after the Euro introduction. Borio and Disyatat (2011) have shown that
capital inflows mainly occur via bank credit and not via excessive savings from
abroad (similarly Kohler 2022).
iii) Introduce labor productivity growth that is endogenous to investment resembling Hicks (1932) and Kaldor (1957).
iv) Disaggregate production into investment and consumption goods, with
capital goods of the North having a higher mark-up due to high price setting
power.
v) Start the model with different exchange rates and model the introduction of
the Euro as a shock that depresses the exports of the periphery, while treating
the exchange rate between the monetary union and RoW fixed as the exchange
rate management by the People’s Bank of China allows for fluctuations within a
corridor.
vi) It should not be the private banks who face the haircut when their borrowers
default, but the respective government in turn is bailing out its banks after a
threshold and the debt is transferred from the banks balance sheet to the balance
sheet of the government as happened in the Eurozone after the global financial
crisis of 2007/8.
vii) Expand the financial sector. Explicitly model bonds and stocks, and Tobinesque portfolio choice (see Belabed et al. 2018 for deposits + equity). In Gräb-
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ner et al. (2021) bank deposits are the only financial assets households accumulate. Respective interest rates on loans and deposits are the same across all
sectors, i.e. the same interest rate is applied for loans to households, firms and
governments. Belabed et al. (2018) assume equality of lending and deposit rates
to rule out banks profits (p.59). I believe this needs to be adjusted to take the
different default probabilities into account. For example, in Godley and Lavoie
(2007) households hold domestic currency but bills from either of the three governments based on Tobinesque principles (see their coding on p.7, or Duwicquet
and Mazier 2012 p.203). The Euro central bank holds bills in both currencies
while the FED only holds dollar bills because the USD is the international reserve currency (p.9). The ECB is prohibited from directly purchasing bills from
their governments due to Article 21.1 of the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (ECB 2004, see Godley and
Lavoie 2007 p.12).
viii) Gräbner et al. (2021) analyze two policy responses: counter-cyclical fiscal policy and an extensive lender of last resort function by the central bank.
Counter-cyclical fiscal policy stabilizes the Southern economy and its demand
for North’s exports, however, after a few cycles, bank’s profits erode sufficiently
to trigger a credit constraint for reserve lending from the North and a strong
contraction only alleviated by the central bank stepping in to sustain interest
flows from South to North. However, when the central bank steps in quicker
as an unconditional lender of last resort, long depressions can be prevented (p.
25). The counter-cyclical fiscal policy is constrained by some arbitrary parameter
choices. In the future, I will apply a punishment whenever governments violate
the Maastricht criteria.
ix) Incorporate business saving in the core and consumer finance.
x) introduce a housing asset as in Zezza (2008)
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6. CONCLUSION
In this thesis I have argued that economies with income inequality face a growth
problem. This has led to the emergence of export-led and debt-led growth
regimes which are in a dialectical relationship with one another. An example for
this is the EMU in which several dynamics lead to persistent divergence. First,
the institutionalized shift in the functional income distribution in Germany has
decreased demand for imports from the peripheral EMU. Second, differences in
economic complexity lead to different export demand elasticities. While exports
from Germany face mostly non-price competition, the peripheral EMU got into
a price competition with China. Third, the introduction of the Euro removed
exchange rate risk within the EMU and has thereby led to capital flows and a
real estate bubble in the periphery. This heated up labor markets and led to a
further deterioration of its competitiveness vis a vis China. After the GFC, the
adjustment burden was taken upon the deficit countries through bailouts and
conditional lending. This has further depressed demand and thereby imports,
turning some economies into net exporters, however, only by causing a long
recession.
This thesis calls for various policy responses and institutional changes. First,
increasing wages and fiscal expansion in the core can create demand for imports from the periphery. Second, a removal of the debt limits within the EMU
should allow for a more active industrial policy in order to initialize a technological catching up process. Third, and more generally, the adjustment burden
ought to be put on the surplus countries, as enforced austerity will only make
the problem worse. Storm and Naastepad (2016, p.63) argue that labor market
deregulation can actually have negative effect on technological catching up as
it leads to less investment in human capital by firms and labor saving technical
change (Kohler and Stockhammer 2020, p.32).
Finally, I argue that income inequality can be seen as an initial sin of capitalism.
An economy that does not produce sufficient drawing rights on its produce
faces a realization problem which can only be solved temporarily through domestic or foreign debt. Debt-led and export-led growth regimes can temporarily
mask stagnation, at some point, however, debt service takes over and thereby
leading to a financial crisis. On an international scale, income inequality exports
stagnation to countries with elastic demand for their exports. ´
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Appendix
Here is a full list of the equations of the model.
The GDP expenditure equation for region i is given by
GDPi = Ci + Ii + Gi + Xi − I Mi

(1)

Income for the rentiers in region i consists of net interest and firm and bank
profits minus repayment of loans. Income for the workers in region i consists of
wage income plus net interest minus repayment of loans. Both pay a uniform
tax rate on their income, hence, disposable income is given by
YR,i = (1 − th) ∗ (id ∗ MR,i − il ∗ L R,i − REPR,i¸ + DIVB,i + DIVF,i )

(2)

YW,i = (1 − th) ∗ (wi ∗ Ni + id ∗ MW,i − il ∗ LW,i − REPW,i )

(3)

where id and il are the uniform interest rates on deposits and loans respectively.
Tax revenue is then given by multiplying the uniform tax rate with the income
flows:
Ti = th ∗ (YR,i + YW,i )

(4)

Workers and rentiers have the same consumption demand function, though
with different propensities, resembling Kaleckian ideas. The code ensures that
the autonomous component of demand provides a floor to consumption demand:
Cd R,i = Max [c0R,i + c1R,i ∗ YR,i (−1) + c2R,i ∗ VR,i (−1), c0R,i ]

(5)

CdW,i = Max [c0W,i + c1W,i ∗ YW,i (−1) + c2W,i ∗ VW,i (−1), c0W,i ]

(6)

with c1R,i + c2R,i < c1W,i + c2W,i
A region’s consumption demand is given by the sum of rentier’s and worker’s
consumption demand:
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Cdi = Cd R,i + CdW,i

(7)

However, this is not the final consumption as part of it is imported and the domestic banking system can be credit constrained. Therefore, we will first determine the investment demand and government spending demand.
Firms distribute all profits to the domestic rentiers. Therefore, investment is
entirely financed by bank loans. This lending relationship can be constrained
when the past period’s rate of profit π f ,i falls short of the past period’s margin
of safety θ F,i . The firm’s profit rate is given by dividing gross profits through the
stock of capital:
π f ,i =

Π F,i
Ki

(8)

The margin of safety vis-á-vis firms decreases slowly in periods of stability and
spikes in periods of financial distress.
θ F,i = Max [(θ F,i (−1) + µ F,i ∗ |θ F,i (−1)| + ζ 1 ∗ ∆DR F,i +

 LR (−1) > 0 V LR (−2) > 0 : ζ ∗ ∆LR
2
B,i
B,i
B,i
)
otherwise:
0

(9)

, 0]
where µ F,i adds to the margin of safety when firm loans are canceled.

µ F,i


Canc (−1) = 0 :
F,i
=
otherwise:

−γ f

(10)

τf

A proportion χ of firm loans are canceled when their profit rate falls short of
their margin of safety and their profits are negative, conditioned of having a
positive amount of outstanding loans.

Canc F,i =


π

F,i

− θ F,i < 0

V

Π F,i < 0

otherwise:

V

L F,i > 0 :

χ ∗ L F,i
0
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(11)

The debt ratio of the firms is given by:
L F,i
Ki

(12)

Assets B,i
ei ∗ pie

(13)

DR F,i =
The leverage ratio of the banks is given by:
LR B,i =

where the amount of equities in each banking system ei as well as their price
level pie remain constant in this version of the model. In line with Godley and
Lavoie (2012, Chapter 11), I assume that rentiers have initially invested some
capital which leads to flows of dividend payments in every period.
Investment demand then is given by an autonomous component plus an amount
that depends on the capacity utilization zi , the rate of profit π F,i and the debt
ratio DR F,i of the past period. However, when the firm’s are credit constrained,
a fixed rate of credit restriction rcr applies. The autonomous component sets a
floor to investment demand in periods of distress.

Idi = Max [

π (−1) ≥ θ (−1) : i0 + i1 ∗ z (−1)+ i2 ∗ π (−1)+ i3 ∗ DR (−1)
F,i
F,i
i
i
i
i
F,i
i
F,i
otherwise:
rcr (i0i + i1i ∗ zi (−1)+ i2i ∗ π F,i (−1)+ i3i ∗ DR F,i (−1))
, i0i ]
(14)
where capacity utilization is given by dividing GDP by potential output:
zi =

Yi
Ypi

(15)

and potential output by multiplying the stock of capital with capital productivity κi
Ypi = Ki ∗ κi
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(16)

The government’s demand for spending is given by its income: taxes, the region’s share of central bank profits plus net interest income.
Gdi = Ti (−1) + ρi ∗ Π ECB (−1) − il ∗ LG,i + id ∗ MG,i

(17)

As indicated above, fulfilling demand for consumption, investment and government spending depends on the ability of the domestic banking system to
finance a fraction which is imported.
Reserve demand for the bank sector in region i is given by:

Resd,i = Mi − Xi − ρi ∗ Π ECB − id ∗ Resi (−1) + (i IB + a) ∗ ( L IB,i (−1)+
L ECB,i (−1) − L IB,j (−1)) + rrr ∗ MP,i (−1) − Resi (−1)

(18)

where
i IB is the interbank interest rate for reserve lending
a is the installment rate at which interbank and central bank loans are paid back
annually
L IB,i are the interbank loans from region j to region i
L ECB,i are the central bank loans to region i
rrr is the fixed minimum reserve requirement
MP,i are the private sector money deposits in region i, hence MP,i = MR,i + M H,i
Resi is the stock of ECB reserves hold by banks in region i.
Banks can borrow reserves through the interbank market as long as they are
not credit constrained, hence π B,i ≥ θ B,i . The bank’s margin of safety declines
in periods in which no interbank loans are canceled but spikes in periods of
financial distress. It also depends on both banking system’s changes in their
leverage ratios:
θ B,i = Max [θ B,i (−1) + µ B,i ∗ |theta B,i (−1)|+

 LR (−1) > 0 V LR (−2) > 0 : η ∗ ∆LR
1
B,i
B,i
B,i
otherwise:
0
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(19)


 LR (−1) > 0 V LR (−2) > 0 : η ∗ ∆LR
2
B,j
B,j
B,j
+
otherwise:

0
, 0]

where µ B,i adds to the margin of safety when bank loans are canceled.

µ B,i


Canc (−1) = 0
B,i
=
otherwise:

− γb

(20)

τb

A proportion χ of firm loans are canceled when their profit rate falls short of
their margin of safety and their profits are negative, conditioned of having a
positive amount of outstanding loans. CancBmin indicates a minimum amount
of loans canceled to speed up the adjustment process in recessions.

Canc B,i


V
V


L (−1) > 0 π B,i − θ B,i < 0 Π B,i < 0 :

 IB,i
= Min[CancBmin, Ł IB,i (−1) − a ∗ L IB,i (−1)]]



otherwise:

Max [χ ∗ L IB,i (−1),
0
(21)

If bank’s are not credit constrained, demand for interbank loans is limited by the
other banking system’s excess reserves:

Ld IB,i


V
V


π B,i (−1) − θ B,i (−1) ≥ 0
Resdi (−1) > 0
Resd j (−1) < 0 :


= Min[ Resdi (−1), − Resd j (−1)]



otherwise:

0
(22)

The rest can be borrowed directly from the ECB:

Ld ECB,i


 Resd > Ld
i
IB,i :
=
otherwise:
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Resdi − Ld IB,i
0

(23)

If one region’s banking sector is credit constrained import demand is reduced to
the amount of reserves available for international clearing. As this mechanism
can lead to strong contractions, a fixed emergency lending rate elr provides a
floor for consumption demand that is financed.


π (−1) < θ (−1) :
B,i
B,i
Cd f i =
otherwise:

[ Max [ Min[Cdi , RCCi ∗

Cdi
Cdi + Idi + Gdi ], elr

∗ Cdi ]

Cdi
(24)


π (−1) < θ (−1)
B,i
B,i
Id f i =
otherwise:

[ Max [ Min[ Idi , RCCi ∗

Idi
Cdi + Idi + Gdi ], elr

∗ Idi ]

Idi
(25)


π (−1) < θ (−1)
B,i
B,i
Gd f i =
otherwise:

[ Max [ Min[ Gdi , RCCi ∗

Gdi
Cdi + Idi + Gdi ], elr

∗ Gdi ]

Gdi
(26)

where the rate of credit restriction is computed as

RCCi = ( Xi (−1) + ρi ∗ Π ECB (−1) + id ∗ Resi (−1) + i IB ∗ ( L IB,j (−1)

− L IB,i − L ECB,i (−1)) + Resi (−1) − rrr ∗ Mh,i )/mn

(27)

The rate of credit restriction is based on the net inflow of reserves in the current period. Since Xi is not determined yet, Xi (−1) serves as a proxy. Resi ∗
Cdi
Cdi + Idi + Gdi is the amount of reserves allocated to consumption and mi ∗ Cdi is
the share of consumption demand that is imported. Both have to be equal in
order for the imports to be financed. If the banking sector is credit constrained,
Cdi
Resi
i
only a fraction can be financed: Ci = Res
mi ∗ Cdi + Idi Gdi where mi is the factor with which import demand of consumption, investment and government
spending is multiplied.
Import demand of region i for goods of region j is given by:
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I Md j,i = m j,i ∗ (Cd f i + Id f i + Gd f i )

(28)

As a last step, the model checks whether the import demand can be fulfilled
given the productive capacity of the exporting economy. This capacity restriction rate (crri ) is given by:

crri =




(((1 − m j,i − mrow,i )∗(Cd f i + Id f i + Gd f i)+ I Mdi,j + Xdrow,i )/Ypi ) ≤ 1 : 1


otherwise:



Yp /((1 − m − m
i
j,i
row,i ) ∗ (Cd f i + Id f i + Gd f i ) + I Mdi,j + Xdrow,i ))

(29)
Finally, actual imports of region i are given by:
I Mi = crr j ∗ I Md j,i + I Mrow,i

(30)

Ci = crri ∗ Cd f i

(31)

Ii = crri ∗ Id f i

(32)

Gi = crri ∗ Gd f i

(33)

Capital accumulates through investment and minus depreciation.
Ki = Ki (−1) − δ ∗ Ki (−1) + Ii

(34)

The price level in region i is given by:
p i = wi ∗

1
∗ (1 + φi )
λi

(35)

where wi is the money wage per unit of labor in region i, αi is the output-labor
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ratio in region i, and φi is the constant mark-up in region i.
Inflation is then
pii = pi /pi (−1) − 1

(36)

The wage rate in region i is given by:
wii = σi0 + σi1 ∗ ∆pie + σi2 ∗ ∆λe − σi3 ∗ ui (−1)

(37)

wi = wi (−1) ∗ (1 + wii )

(38)

As both regions in the monetary union differ by their labor market institutions,
the parameters in the respective wage equations reflect the Varieties of Capitalism literature.
σs1 > σn1 , as workers in the periphery are assumed to be more successful in
bargaining for nominal wage increases when inflation is expected
σn2 > σs2 , as workers in the periphery are assumed to resist stronger to wage
cuts when unemployment rises compared to the core.
Expected inflation follows simple backward looking expectations:
pie = pi (−1)

(39)

Unemployment in period in region i is given by:
ui =

Ni − Ei
Ni

(40)

Populations are assumed to be constant,
Ni = Ni

(41)

Employment in region i is determined by output divided by labor productivity:

63

Ei =

Yt,i
λi

(42)

Labor productivity is constant in the stationary version of the model: λi = 1.
The total wage bill is given by:
WBi = wi ∗ Ei

(43)

The price level in the RoW is assumed to be constant: PRoW = 1
The propensity to import of the north from the south is given by:
ms,n = ψ0 − ψ1 ∗ ( ps − prow )

(44)

Imports of the south and of the RoW from the north do not depend on the price
levels but are inelastic. So mn,s = ψ2 and mn,row = ψ3 .
Imports of the south from the RoW also depend on relative prices since domestic households and firms also take relative prices of the price competing produce into account.

ms,row = ψ4 − ψ5 ∗ ( prow − ps )

(45)

In every period, a constant proportion of the outstanding loans is repaid:
Rep R,i = a ∗ L R,i (−1)

(46)

RepW,i = a ∗ LW,i (−1)

(47)

Rep F,i = a ∗ L F,i (−1)

(48)
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RepG,i = a ∗ LG,i (−1)

(49)

Rep IB,i = a ∗ L IB,i (−1)

(50)

Rep ECB,i = a ∗ L ECB,i (−1)

(51)

The change in the stock of loans by firms is given by:
∆L F,i = − Rep F,i − Canc F,i + Ii

(52)

L F,i = L F,i (−1) + ∆L F,i

(53)

Firm’s profits and net wealth are given by:
Π F,i = Yi − WBi − il ∗ L F,i (−1) − Rep F,i

(54)

DIVF,i = Π F,i

(55)

VF,i = Ki − L F,i

(56)

The flow of savings of rentiers and workers are given by:
SR,i = YR,i − CR,i

(57)

SW,i = YW,i − CW,i

(58)

In this model, the only financial asset is bank deposits. Therefore, positive savings led to an increase in bank deposits and negative savings are partly deducted from the stock of deposits and partly financed through new bank loans:
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∆MR,i =

∆MW,i =

∆L R,i =

∆LW,i =


S

R,i

≥0:

SR,i

otherwise:

Min[SR,i /2, MR,i ]


S

SW,i

W,i

≥0:

otherwise:

(59)

(60)

Min[SW,i /2, MW,i ]

MR,i = MR,i (−1) + ∆MR,i

(61)

MW,i = MW,i (−1) + ∆MW,i

(62)


S

R,i

<0:

− Rep R,i − (SR,i − ∆MR,i )

otherwise:

− Rep R,i


S

− RepW,i − (SW,i − ∆MW,i )

W,i

<0:

otherwise:

− RepW,i

(63)

(64)

L R,i = L R,i (−1) + ∆L R,i

(65)

LW,i = LW,i (−1) + ∆LW,i

(66)

The net wealth of rentiers and workers is then given by:
VR,i = MR,i − L R,i + pie ∗ ei

(67)

VW,i = MW,i − LW,i

(68)

Government saving is given by:
SG,i = Ti − ρi ∗ Π ECB − Gi − il ∗ LG,i − RepG,i + id ∗ MG,i
which leads to a change in the stock of government debt:
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(69)

∆MG,i =


S

G,i

∆LG,i = − RepG,i − SG,i

(70)

LG,i = LG,i (−1) + ∆LG,i

(71)

≤ ( LG,i (−1) − RepG,i )

V

SG,i < 0

V

MG,i (−1) > 0 :

Min[SG,i , MG,i ]
SG,i − ( LG,i − RepG,i )
(72)

otherwise:

MG,i = MG,i (−1) + ∆MG,i

(73)

Government net wealth is given by:
VG,i = MG,i − LG,i

(74)

The changes in firm debt and their net wealth are given by:
∆L F,i = − Rep F,i − Canc F,i + Ii

(75)

L F,i = L F,i (−1) + ∆L F,i

(76)

VF,i = Ki − L F,i

(77)

Bank profits are given by:
Π B,i = il ∗ ( L R,i (−1) + LW,i (−1) + L F,i (−1) + LG,i (−1))−

(i IB + a) ∗ ( L ECB,i (−1) + L IB,i (−1) − L IB,j (−1)) − id ∗ ( MR,i (−1)+

(78)

MW,i (−1) + MG,i (−1) − Resi (−1))
DIVB,i = Π B,i
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(79)

ECB’s profits are given by:

Π ECB = i IB ∗ ( LECB, i (−1) + L ECB,j (−1)) − id ∗ ( Resi (−1) + Res j (−1))

(80)

Some equations which follow from trade finance have been excluded above to
make the flow of the argument more comprehensive. Those are listed here:

∆Resi = − I Mi + Xi + ρi ∗ Π ECB + id ∗ Resi (−1) + (i IB + a) ∗ ( L IB,j (−1)

− L IB,i (−1) − L ECB,i (−1)) + Ld IB,i − Ld IB,j + Ld ECB,i

(81)

Resi = Resi (−1) + ∆Resi

(82)

∆L IB,i = Ld IB,i − a ∗ L IB,i (−1) − Canc B,i

(83)

L IB,i = L IB,i (−1) + ∆L IB,i

(84)

∆L ECB,i = Ld ECB,i − a ∗ Ld ECB,i (−1)

(85)

L ECB,i = L ECB,i (−1) + ∆L ECB,i

(86)

VECB = − Resi − Res j + L ECB,i + L ECB,j + Res f ECB − Resrow

(87)

Assets B,i = L F,i + LG,i + L H,i + L IB,j + Resi

(88)

VB,i = − MR,i − MW,i + L R,i + LW,i + L F,i + LG,i − MG,i +
Resi − L ECB,i + L IB,j − L IB,i

(89)

Rest of the world:
Xdrow,i = mi,row ∗ Yrow
68

(90)

where GDP of the RoW is fixed and endogenously given.
If region j is capacity constrained, goods are instead imported from RoW:
change how I explained this in the code.
I Mrow,i = mrow,i ∗ (Ci + Ii + Gi ) + I Md j,i ∗ (1 − crr j )

(91)

Xi = ( I M j − I Mrow,j + Xrow,i )

(92)

Actual exports from region i to RoW:
XRoW,i = crri ∗ Xdrow,i

(93)

The RoW obtains reserves to settle trade by exchanging domestic currency reserves for monetary union currency reserves at the fixed and exogenous exchange rate.

FRTrow




( Resrow (−1) + I Mrow,i + I Mrow,j − Xrow,i − Xrow,j ) ≥ 0 :


= (−( I Mrow,i + I Mrow,j − Xrow,i − Xrow,j ) − Resrow )



otherwise:

(94)
0

∆Resrow = I Mrow,i + I Mrow,j − Xrow,i − Xrow,j + FRTrow

(95)

Resrow = Resrow (−1) + ∆Resrow

(96)

RoW’s foreign reserve transactions equal the change in ECB’s foreign reserves:
∆Res f ECB = FRTrow (−1)

(97)

Res f ECB = Res f ECB (−1) + ∆Res f ECB

(98)

Vrow = Resrow − Res f ECB

(99)
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